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ABSTRACT: Normative characterization is a commonplace feature of biological and cognitive explanation. Such lan-
guage seems to commit the biological and cognitive sciences to the existence of natural norms, but it is also dif-
ficult to understand how such normativity fits into a natural world of physical causes and forces. I propose to 
map normativity onto systems stabilized by counteractive constraints. Such a mapping, I believe, can explain 
normativity’s causal-explanatory role in biological and cognitive inquiry. The common approach in the litera-
ture is to derive an account of natural normativity by way of a particular theory of function. I avoid that ap-
proach here and attempt to address directly the sort of physical systems that might satisfy naturalizing criteria 
for normativity. This has the advantages, I think, of allowing an account of normativity without first having to 
decide the correct theory of function as well as allowing for the theoretical possibility that normative and func-
tional explanation might come apart within empirical explanation.
Keywords: natural normativity; biological norm; cognitive norm; function; biological explanation.
RESUMEN: La caracterización normativa es un rasgo común de las explicaciones biológicas y cognitivas. Ese lenguaje pa-
rece comprometer a las ciencias biológicas y cognitivas con la existencia de normas naturales, pero es difícil en-
tender cómo dicha normatividad encaja en un mundo natural de fuerzas y causas físicas. Propongo representar 
la normatividad en sistemas estabilizados mediante condicionamientos opuestos. Esta representación, en mi 
opinión, puede explicar el rol explicativo-causal de la normatividad en la investigación biológica y cognitiva. 
Lo usual en la literatura sobre el tema consiste en derivar una explicación de  la normatividad natural a partir 
de una teoría particular sobre la noción de función. Esquivaré este planteamiento e intentaré abordar directa-
mente el tipo de sistemas físicos que podrían satisfacer criterios naturalizadores de la normatividad. Esto tiene 
las ventajas, pienso, de que permite una explicación de la normatividad sin tener que decidir primero la teoría 
correcta de la función, y en segundo lugar, queda abierta la posibilidad teórica de que la explicación normativa y 
funcional puedan tratarse separadamente dentro de la explicación empírica.  
Palabras clave: normatividad natural, norma biológica, norma cognitiva, función, explicación biológica.
1. Introduction
Natural phenomena are often normatively characterized in the biological and cognitive sci-
ences: e.g., livers can be well-formed/malformed; hearts can function properly/improperly; 
fawns can hide well/poorly; penguins can identify/misidentify their young; ants can calcu-
late/miscalculate their route home; or, deer can perceive/misperceive a predator. The pre-
vious activities, behaviors, and structures are characterized or described by how well they 
*  Thanks to Candice Shelby, Gabriel Zamosc-Regueros, and the anonymous referees for many helpful 
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match up to or correspond with some standard or norm, some specification of how the ac-
tion, performance, or structural design ought to be. The extent to which some item meets 
a standard or norm, that item’s normative status, seems often to serve a causal-explanatory 
function in these sciences: the fawn’s poor hiding behavior explains its capture by an eagle; 
poor sperm motility explains a male’s low fecundity; a poorly developed heart valve explains 
the low viability of its possessor; and, misperceiving glass as open space explains avians’ ten-
dency to fly into windows. In these types of explanation, the failure of the item to be as it 
ought seems to have a causal function in explaining some further natural phenomenon.
The biological and cognitive sciences seemingly assume that normative status is a 
causal-explanatory feature of the natural world. Prima facie such an assumption seems 
rather odd: normative status does not seem readily to fit into the picture of the natural 
world otherwise presented by the sciences, a natural world of physical forces, chemical reac-
tions, metabolism, and so on. The oddity of that assumption would be quickly made a non-
issue if we were to adopt a global non-literal construal of the normative language present in 
these explanations. Davies (2001), for example, suggests that we do just that: the pervasive 
presence of normative language within the biological and cognitive sciences is, he thinks, 
a mere artifact of human psychology, just a cognitive trick for the human mind to grapple 
with complex phenomena. Yet that easy remedy itself seems to be at odds with the broader 
picture of the natural world presented by the sciences.
Along with electrons, gravitational fields, and enzymes, that world purportedly con-
tains a diversity of organismal representational systems. As evidenced by much of the cog-
nitive ethological literature, such representational systems seem to play a significant role 
in explaining a broad range of biological behavior and response. Unlike pure information-
bearing systems, the tokened states of representing systems, whether in the skull or out in 
public, are supposedly contentful independent of whether the relevant represented state ex-
ists. That content and, say, truth-value can come apart makes possible representational and 
cognitive errors: e.g., misperceivings, false believings, false signals, or mistakes in categoriz-
ing, judging, or evaluating. Since this independence between the content of the represent-
ing and the status of the represented seems to be a constitutive and distinguishing feature 
of representing systems, positing a representing system seemingly presupposes that norma-
tive status is a genuine feature of the natural world. Or, simply representational activity 
just seems to be the sort of activity that can be performed rightly/wrongly, correctly/incor-
rectly, or well/poorly. A global non-literal construal of the normative language present in 
biological and cognitive explanation would seem then to eliminate the possibility of genu-
ine representational and cognitive errors, and that would seem to imply, in turn, that there 
just are not really representational systems at all. While representational explanations of or-
ganismal behavior might be supplanted by alternative explanatory forms (e.g., by dynamic 
systems or connectionist explanations), the oddity of their presuppositions (i.e., that cogni-
tive and representational systems literally commit mistakes) is no reason on its own to re-
ject the representational explanations offered as literally true.
The state of play seems to be this: ascribing normative status to natural phenomena is 
both prima facie at odds with the picture of the natural world presented by the sciences and 
integral to it. What seems to be needed is some way to map the normative language present 
in biological and cognitive explanation onto otherwise accepted natural processes in such 
a way that the normative language can play its assigned causal-explanatory role. I want to 
suggest here one way to do such a mapping. Normative language looks, I think, to map well 
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onto certain sorts of stabilized systems, and stabilized systems of these sorts seem to be the 
key targets of biological and cognitive inquiry.
I will take a somewhat different approach than is common in the literature. Concerns 
about the naturalistic status of normative ascription tend to be contained within concerns 
about the naturalistic status of functional ascription. This focus is reasonable. Functional 
ascription is a prominent feature of biological and cognitive explanation, and functions 
seem to be the sort of thing that might be performed more or less well. Prima facie a theory 
of natural function should accommodate normative characterization. I propose to go for-
ward here, however, with minimal attention to function. The intent is to methodologically 
isolate the normative question from the functional one. The reason to take this methodo-
logical approach is two-fold. First, it might provide a way to address directly the question of 
natural normativity without having first to adjudicate the contentious space of functional 
theory. Second, it provides a way to avoid a common but, I think, questionable assumption, 
namely that normative characterization is limited to functional explanation. Given its com-
monality, let me briefly motivate why that assumption is better avoided at the outset.
In at least the mundane case of human cultural norms, the normative and the func-
tional hypothesis are independent hypotheses. We can recognize the presence of a wide 
range of human standards, e.g., standards of dress, greeting rituals, personal distance, gen-
der specific behavior, pronunciation, etc., without first identifying any particular function 
that such a standard might serve. Further, we can appeal to the presence of a cultural norm 
in order to explain the stability of communal conforming behavior as well as responses to 
deviance without first hypothesizing any function. And, while it is perfectly plausible that a 
given norm performs a social function, it is also plausible that a norm might perpetuate in-
dependent of any particular function. For example, a standard of dress might remain stable 
despite shifts in function, e.g., shifting from the function of gender identification to profes-
sion identification. Or, a standard of pronunciation can emerge in an isolated community 
without any function; it might simply be the consequence of language learners conforming 
behavior to expert speakers. That standard of pronunciation might come to possess a func-
tion, e.g., in-group identification, as our isolated community has increasing contact with 
others. In at least the ordinary and mundane case of human social norms, the norm need 
not be derivative from function.
The two can apparently come apart, because the human cultural norm is often seem-
ingly just a certain sort of replicated behavior. For standards of dress, personal distance, 
greeting rituals and the like to emerge and perpetuate, what is required are replicating 
mechanisms, namely social learning mechanisms which can conform naïve and deviant 
members to displayed behaviors. Just as the stability of a phenotypic trait in a population 
may be solely the result of the replicative engine, so too human cultural norms may emerge 
and be sustained by psychological replicative or conforming mechanisms independent of 
function.
There is no reason to suppose that the full range of human cultural norms are main-
tained or perpetuated through high level cognitive functioning or anything like explicit 
conscious judgment. Imitative and emulative mechanisms more than suffice to standardize 
accents, surface grammar, greeting rituals and the like. But, imitative and emulative mecha-
nisms for social learning are by no means the sole province of the human animal. In fact, the 
biological literature already provides a strong analogue of the human cultural norm, namely 
the “tradition”. A tradition is just any socially proliferated trait or behavior – that is, it is a 
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trait proliferated through interaction with conspecifics and not through reproduction.1 A 
wide range of more or less cognitive mechanisms have been identified as proliferating traits 
socially within biological populations. For example, local groupings of rats exhibit food tra-
ditions which proliferate through behaviors such as responding to odorants on the breadth 
of encountered rats. (Galef & Laland 2005) Or, there are the localized song dialects of hum-
mingbirds (Apodiformes), parrots (Psittaciformes), and the true songbirds (oscine Passeri-
formes) which proliferate through imitative mechanisms as well as the fine-tuning of inher-
ited auditory song templates to presented songs.2 (Janik & Slater 2003; Shettleworth 1998, 
chap. 10) Or, imitation and emulation might account for a wide array of localized behaviors 
within chimpanzees. (Whiten et. al. 2001). The key to the emergence of a tradition is the 
presence of a social learning mechanism, e.g., imitation or emulation, that replicates and pro-
liferates behavior exhibited by conspecifics. Whether a given tradition serves a function as 
well is a further independent empirical hypothesis. For example, the distinctive rain dances 
performed by chimpanzee troops might lack any function. (Nakamura 2002))
My point is not that biological traditions are examples of norms. They may or may not 
be. Instead, the point is just to notice that it should not be taken as a given that normative 
characterization is the servant of functional explanation. Human cultural norms come apart 
from function, because the presence of the human cultural norm is often seemingly just de-
pendent on the presence of certain behaviorally conforming mechanisms. Plausibly the mech-
anisms implicated in many human cultural norms do not involve higher level cognitive capac-
ities but involve social learning mechanisms shared by many other organisms. If so, plausibly 
normativity might come apart from function in biological explanations extending past hu-
man behavior for just the same reasons as they come apart in the human case. So, if we are go-
ing to take the possibility of natural normativity seriously, I think that it is better at the outset 
to avoid the assumption that normativity’s role is limited to functional explanation.
Here’s the plan. I will first set out some naturalistic criteria specific to normativity. I 
will then offer an abstract model of a causal set-up built for the express purpose of satisfy-
ing those naturalistic criteria. That model is, however, just an abstract model. The next step 
will be to show that the model is realized by systems at the core of biological inquiry and 
that its realization by such systems can account for normativity’s apparent causal-explana-
tory role. Last, given this model for natural normativity, I will address its potential implica-
tions with respect to naturalistic theories of function.
2. Naturalistic criteria
Before presenting a model of natural normativity, it would help to have in place some crite-
ria for appraising such a naturalistic model. I will suggest two general criteria for any natu-
ralizing project and two further criteria specific to normativity.
Call any explanatory-cum-classificatory practice to be naturalized the ‘target practice’. 
Plausibly any naturalizing project should provide 1) a means to map some range of the tar-
1  See Fragaszy& Perry (2003) for an excellent introduction to the biological investigation of traditions in 
non-human populations.
2  According to Janik and Slater (2003), these three groups represent half of all present bird species. 
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get practice’s phenomena onto otherwise accepted natural phenomena and 2) that map-
ping should accommodate the explanations offered by the target practice. A model need 
not provide for a perfect or complete mapping between the target practice and otherwise 
accepted natural phenomena. An incomplete mapping, a mapping that only accounts for 
some of the target practice, might result for a couple of reasons: 1) the target practice has 
overextended its classificatory practice to cover phenomena which simply do not fit into 
the natural world; or 2) the target practice classifies phenomena in such a way that no sin-
gle mapping to other phenomena will do. A model that only maps some of the target range 
is not wrong or mistaken; it just simply isn’t the end of the story. A model is not falsified 
by pointing out that it does not cover this or that case. Models are, instead, accepted or re-
jected given their comparative virtues with other offered models.
To extract plausible naturalistic criteria specific to normativity, I will concentrate 
on normativity’s paradigmatic role in evaluative judgment. In that role, there is nothing 
particularly mysterious about normativity. A norm is simply a represented measure or 
standard used to evaluate states of the world. The normative status ascribed to some item 
(that is, x is good/bad, is right/wrong, is correct/incorrect, etc.) is simply the judgmental 
result.
For example, assume ‘Fire exits are unblocked’ is tokened in a scenario in which fire ex-
its are blocked. The deviation between the indicated and actual states of affairs makes pos-
sible two distinct logical consequences: the representation is incorrect, or the actual state of 
affairs is. Whether the representation is factive or normative determines which logical con-
sequence obtains. If factive, the representation is false, incorrect, wrong, inaccurate, and so 
on. The blocked fire exits are neither right nor wrong; they just are. If normative, the actual 
state of affairs is incorrect or wrong, not the representation. Whether factive or normative, 
the representation is, nonetheless, an indicative representation: it indicates a state of affairs 
that might deviate from the actual state of affairs. For the factive, the degree of deviation of 
the actual state from the indicated state determines the representational status (e.g., true/
false, right/wrong, etc.) of the representation. For the normative, the degree of deviation of 
the actual state from the indicated state determines the normative status of the actual state 
of affairs. That’s the indicative, so consider the imperative ‘Lock the door.’ That imperative 
might be given a non-normative or a normative construal. For example, let that imperative 
be the expression of my desire and assume that the door just will not lock despite my best 
efforts. It is my desire, not the door, which has been frustrated. As with the indicative, it is 
the representational status of the desire which is affected. (The representational status of 
an imperative is clearly not a truth-value but, instead, is commonly characterized as a satis-
faction-value (i.e., satisfied or unsatisfied).) Consider that same imperative statement now 
to be a standing rule at Grandma’s house. If I fail to lock the door, I am in the wrong, not 
the rule. Just as with the indicative, the logical consequences of the normative imperative 
fall on the actual state of affairs, not on the representation.
Both representational status and normative status indicate, then, the distance between 
the represented state of affairs and the actual state of affairs. The positive language of rep-
resentational status (e.g., true, correct, right, accurate, etc.) and normative status (e.g., right, 
good, correct, etc.) indicate null distance/deviation, and the negative language of represen-
tational status (e.g., false, incorrect, wrong, inaccurate, etc.) and normative status (e.g., in-
correct, wrong, bad, etc.) indicate some distance/deviation. Whether described as distance, 
deviation, or degree of correspondence or alignment, all permit that representational or 
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normative status be continuous, not discrete. Just as we might allow continuous truth-val-
ues in fuzzy logic, so too we can allow things to be more or less good/bad.
Given normativity’s paradigmatic role within evaluative and comparative judgment, 
the most straightforward path to a legitimately naturalized normativity would be to pro-
vide some naturalistic analogue to evaluative judgment. A naturalistic setup will clearly 
not issue in judgments of the form “x is good” or “x is bad.” But, a naturalistic setup might 
produce something functionally analogous to the consequences of those judgments. In the 
cognitive case, evaluative judgments do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, the results of such a 
judgment provide ceteris paribus a reason to act. The judgment “x is false” is ceteris paribus 
a reason to correct the statement, and the judgment that some x is out of alignment with a 
standard is ceteris paribus a reason to correct the world, i.e., to bring it back into alignment 
with the standard. And, in the inverse, just as there is no reason ceteris paribus to correct a 
statement judged to be true, there is no reason ceteris paribus to correct the world when it is 
in line with the norm.3
To have a naturalistic analogue to the cognitive characterization of normativity, what 
we need is 1) a naturalistic setup with a null point from which items might deviate and 2) 
that setup be so structured to return deviant states to the null state. The second conjunct is 
the key to making the case that we have a naturalistic analogue to cognitively characterized 
normativity. That x is wrong should not only have causal consequences within the setup, 
but those consequences should be “corrective” in order to be analogous to the practical 
consequences of normative judgment.
A further criterion should be plausibly added as well. Tokens of, say, the same behavio-
ral type can vary in their normative status depending on when, where, in what culture, en-
vironmental setting, etc. that they take place. For example, a man holding a door open for a 
woman can be correct and upstanding behavior, incorrect and offensive behavior, or neither 
depending on this or that culture at some historical point. This suggests that, whatever natu-
ralistic setup realizes a normative setup, that setup should be something that can be only lo-
cally present, thereby allowing tokens of the same behavioral type in different contexts to 
vary in their normative status. That feature cannot be, then, some ‘internal’ fact about this 
or that token but must be some ‘external’ local fact which has causal effects on local tokens.
3. Setting the Stage
With criteria specific to normativity in hand, the most direct route to a model of norma-
tivity is to build a model system that would satisfy those criteria. In this section, I will con-
struct an abstract schema of a particular subtype of stable system. In the subsequent section, 
I will suggest that normative language can be mapped onto that system in such a way as to 
meet the specific naturalistic criteria for normativity. But, since all of this is only abstract 
model construction, I will then try and show that this abstract system type is instantiated 
in two key types of causal setups for biological and cognitive inquiry.
Before characterizing the relevant subtype, it would be helpful, I think, to have on 
the table a rough sense of a stable system. For contrast, let’s start with a (purely) unstable 
3  For a similar discussion of the naturalistic criteria for normativity, see Bauer (2009). 
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system. Assume that some system (‘S’) is in some initial state ‘α’, and assume that there is 
some set of possible and equally probable state transformations of S from α. For each pos-
sible state transformation, allow some further set of possible state transformations. So, S 
will over time track some trajectory through possibility space. To allow that S might re-
main in α, include α in the set of possible transformations from α. Sα at t1 to Sα at t2 
would be a trivial transformation in state. The only reason to include it as a ‘transforma-
tion’ is that it is a categorically similar and equally probable event as S entering any other 
state at t2. α’s inclusion among possible transformations is not, however, trivial. It allows 
the possibility that S never leaves α, and that in turn makes available the difference be-
tween looking to be and being stable. Or, the inclusion of α in the possible transforma-
tion set allows S to present the mere appearance of stability.The setup so far should be 
clearly an unstable setup as each possible transformation is equally probable. S’s instabil-
ity is increasingly likely to be observed over time, but S’s instability is not constituted by 
time passing. It merely depends on the presence of a setup in which S is at least as likely to 
move away from α as stay in it.
The (purely) stable system just requires a small modification to the (purely) unstable 
system. On the possibility space available at Sα, overlay external constraints reducing to null 
the probability for any transformation excepting the trivial one to α. Assume those external 
constraints are present at every time point. S will track a single trajectory through possibil-
ity space as a consequence, namely staying in α. S is stable, because, given the external con-
straints, there is no probable transformation except the trivial one. The constraints are ‘ex-
ternal’, because the constraints are logically independent of the characterization of S or the 
set of possible transformations. The constraints are, then, something that can be added to 
or subtracted from (at least logically) the possibility space in which S exists. The logical in-
dependence of the constraints allows them to serve to explain the behavior of S: e.g., if it 
had not been for x-constraints, S would have likely moved along a different trajectory. The 
presence of the constraints allows there to be a legitimate distinction between apparently 
and really stable systems. Just as with the unstable system, the stability of S is determined by 
the constraints at a time, so, though stability is a diachronic notion, no time need pass for a 
system to be stable. (Quick modifications can generate other models of a stable system. For 
linear processes, simply chart a non-trivial trajectory through possibility space and place 
constraints at each point to funnel the process. For circular or ‘autocatalytic processes’, 
chart a non-trivial trajectory inclusive of a repeating string of transformations.)
The above models are pure models, because they treat stability as a discrete category. 
There are a number of ways to take those pure models and loosen things up to allow sta-
bility to be, as it is more commonly used, continuous or fuzzy. For example, rather than as-
suming that constraints limit transformations to just one from the set, we can open up the 
range of permitted transformations. E.g., the external constraints limit transformations to 
α and β but transformations within α and β are equally probable. The system is stable given 
the limited trajectory due to the external constraints, but, within the range of permitted 
transformations, the system is unstable – that is, there is no reason why S picks the particu-
lar trajectory through α and β transformations that it does. Instead of altering the range of 
permitted transformations, we might make external constraints temporally limited (e.g., 
at t6 the constraints will fail) or temporally decaying (e.g., at each t, there is an increasing 
probability that S will escape the constraints). Alternatively, we might allow that the con-
straints are permeable in that at each time there is some consistent probability of escape. S 
278 Mark Bauer
Theoria 30/2 (2015): 271-286
would be increasingly likely to be unstable over time, though the constraints are the same 
throughout.
While many further variations are possible, I want to concentrate on just one fur-
ther and quite different variant. The constraints so far prevent S from entering particu-
lar states. Let’s switch from these preventative constraints to counteractive constraints. 
Remove the external constraints and allow S to again move with equal probability in any 
direction within possibility space. For each possible state transformation from α, there 
is again some possible state transformations; call these ‘the secondary sets’. E.g., from α, 
there is a set of transformations (α, β, γ), and from β, there is the secondary set of trans-
formations (α, β, δ). Assume that each secondary set includes α, thereby allowing that S 
can return to α should it leave. Add now a factor to possibility space with the following ef-
fect: every possible transformation in a secondary set other than α is reduced to null prob-
ability. The result is that S in α is unstable: it is at least as likely to leave α as to remain. 
However, if S should leave α, this new factor, a counteractive constraint, sends S back to 
α. Though S is unstable in α, S will spend more time in α than in any other state. Or, a tra-
jectory centered on α is stable for S. Further variations could be introduced by varying the 
weighting of the factor on secondary sets or varying which possibilities it affects, and fur-
ther variations still can be introduced by coupling counteractive and preventative con-
straints.
4. Normative mapping
Taking those quite abstract models, normativity seems appropriately mapped to some but 
not others. Assume S is subject to only preventative constraints, and assume some trajectory 
through possibility space as a result of those constraints. Call those states on that trajectory 
‘favored’ and those off the trajectory ‘unfavored’. The favored/unfavored distinction re-
flects or is a way to describe the shape of the possibility space given the relevant external 
constraints. However, the distinction has little explanatory role outside of a short-hand 
way to characterize on what side of the constraint a possible transformation lies. There is 
no causal implication to being in an unfavored state. The state is simply out of the bounds 
of the constraints, and, should S make it into such a state, the constraints are now causally 
irrelevant to its subsequent trajectory through possibility space. Mapping normative lan-
guage onto preventative constraints just fails to provide the causal explanatory role seem-
ingly presupposed for normative status. However, if one assigns ‘favored’ and ‘unfavored’ 
in the same way for counteractive constraints, there seems to be a different result. There 
are now causal consequences to being unfavored: any S in an unfavored state is more likely 
than not to return to the favored state due to the presence of counteractive constraints, and 
those causal consequences are significant to explain why the long-term trajectory of S cent-
ers on, say, α. That provides at least a possibly naturalistic and causally significant basis for a 
favored/unfavored distinction. The favored are plausibly favored as the causal setup is such 
as to drive S into those states, and the unfavored are plausibly such as the causal setup is 
such as to drive S away from those states.
With at least a possibly naturalistic and causal distinction marked by the favored/un-
favored distinction, that latter distinction might serve to map norms and normative status. 
Take the norm to be the favored state(s) for S, the characterization of which will be an in-
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dicative such as ‘S is α’. (The imperative would clearly be wrong, since this would provide 
a prescriptive rule that the overall setup is striving to follow.) The truth of ‘S is α’ is con-
stituted by the causal setup governing S. The putative norm ‘S is α’ does not imply that S 
is α at any given time. This is what we should expect of a norm, namely that such and such 
norm is the case does not imply that the world is line with that norm. Additionally, rather 
than saying ‘S is α’, we would be justified in saying ‘S ought to be in α’. The latter is not a 
long-run predication, but it says what is ‘owing’ given the setup in which S exists. There is 
nothing, then, mysterious about there being a norm here: it is simply to recognize that a 
particular kind of causal setup is in place. The next step is to map normative status onto 
the favored/unfavored distinction. This seems to track the analogous everyday case. To be 
in the right or to be good is to be acting in some way in agreement with some norm, and it 
is to be acting in a way that should be encouraged or not discouraged. To be in the wrong 
or to be bad is to be acting in some way out of agreement with a norm, and it is be acting in 
a way that should be discouraged or not encouraged. It is to be acting in a way that makes 
one liable to correction.4 Normative status mapped onto the state of an S with a counter-
active constraint setup seems to be strongly analogous to those ordinary everyday thoughts. 
The causal setup is so structured to discourage deviant states by correcting the S to come in 
line with the norm and so structured not to discourage states in line with the norm. It does 
not seem, then, a significant conceptual stretch to map normative language onto such set-
ups, because such setups provide consequences analogous to the consequences of practical 
judgment.
Let’s connect this proposed normative mapping with the two specific criteria for 
naturalized normativity. A stable system with counteractive constraints provides a natu-
ral null point given the facts of the causal setup centering S along a trajectory in possibil-
ity space. That, in turn, provides a naturalistic basis to assign normative status to states 
within the possibility space, and those assignments carry very specific and normatively rel-
evant causal implications: systems out of alignment with the norm are likely to be brought 
back into line, and those in alignment with the norm are likely to be kept in line. Addi-
tionally, the normative status of a tokened S is a property determined by the particular ex-
isting causal setup in which it resides. It is not a universal property of the S-type in some 
4  Phrases such as “should be encouraged” or “liable to correction” might seem to introduce a problem. 
They might be plausibly read as indicating that encouragement or correction is either appropriate or 
likely. Only the likelihood reading will be right for a naturalistic setup. However, if the right reading in 
a normative context is that correction is appropriate, then the plausibility of the proposed normative 
mapping would be specious; it would trade on an equivocation. It is the case in examining the range of 
human norms that there are often further standards governing the appropriateness of correction, stand-
ards governing how, when, and by what parties corrective action might be taken. That said, it is also the 
case in many mundane examples of human norms that the likelihood reading more than suffices. With 
human social norms, such as standards governing eye gaze, personal distance, or pronunciation, there 
might be further standards governing the propriety of corrective forms or which persons might en-
gage in correction, but there need not be. To think that such norms exist in such a population, it suf-
fices that people do respond to deviant and naïve behavior and that such responses generate conform-
ity. Whether correction is or is not appropriate is often beside the point. Or, to say it in another way, 
whether corrective activity is appropriate is not a further question that the anthropologist or sociologist 
need ask and answer before describing a social norm.
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state type – that is, there is no implication that all S’s in some state have the same norma-
tive status or any normative status. As the localized normative status depends on the local 
presence of counteractive constraints, the causal implications of normative status are lo-
calized as well.
5. Satisfying the General Naturalistic Criteria
To satisfy the general naturalistic criteria, it should be plausible that some appreci-
able frequency of biological and cognitive systems are stabilized by counteractive con-
straints.
Many individual biological and cognitive systems do seem plausibly stabilized by way of 
counteractive constraints. Clear candidates are to be found among the varied homeostatic, 
regulatory, maintenance, and repair systems common to organisms. Such systems often 
operate not by preventing a change in state but by returning a system back to some target 
state. For example, sweat production in humans or panting by a canine do not prevent high 
core body temperature but, instead, are induced to lower core body temperature to a target 
range. The previous proposed normative mapping should plausibly apply to such cases. The 
state target maintained by these auxiliary counteracting systems would be the norm. A low 
or high body temperature would be incorrect, because the body at those temperatures is 
apt to be corrected so as to be brought into line with some temperature target for the body. 
(Notice the low or high body temperature is not bad or incorrect because it is deleterious 
to life but is only so due to the presence of counteracting stabilizing systems. That a low or 
high body temperature is deleterious can explain, instead, the presence of such counteract-
ing systems.)
The commonality of counteracting systems in organisms is not a mere coincidental 
fact about the present state of terrestrial life. Any living system, even the simplest unicel-
lular organism, requires a number of complex, extended (and usually cyclic) biochemical 
and physical events to take place in order to remain alive from one moment to the next. 
Environmental variability and internal degradation can not only knock those processes 
off path but will tend to occur at a rate faster than the lifespan of the organism. (Simple 
cases: considering the total temperature range that humans experience in their lifespan, 
without some counteracting measures (e.g., coats, hats, or shelter) most humans would 
quickly freeze or overheat; or, considering the high probability of a cut or injury due to 
moving about during a human’s lifespan, humans would quickly die from blood loss with-
out platelets.) Organisms incapable of counteracting environmental variability or inter-
nal degradation would simply fail. It should be expected, then, that any examined living 
system will have an array of counteracting systems. Identifying and explaining the role of 
such counteracting systems should be a key part of explaining how organisms make a liv-
ing in the world. Here’s the reason to note these large-scale biological hypotheses: given 
the centrality of maintaining target states for organismal operation, we should expect nor-
mative characterization to be widespread in the biological and cognitive sciences given the 
suggested mapping above.
Biological and cognitive explanations are frequently directed at populational phe-
nomena, e.g., the frequency distribution of genders, alleles, or specialized behaviors within 
a population. The general aim with such population level phenomena is to account for 
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the stability of a frequency distribution or, for evolutionary explanations, a stable popula-
tional trajectory through, say, morphological space.5 The population is most commonly a 
reproductively-bound population but it need not be. In ecology, the considered population 
might be the whole set of individuals within an ecosystem or populations characterized by 
an ecological role (e.g., predators, scroungers, canopy-dwellers, canopy-creators, etc.); either 
way, the total members of these ecological populations do not stand in reproductive rela-
tions to one another.
Populational stability can reflect factors that might be characterized as preventative. 
For example, the fidelity of a reproductive process prevents the emergence of variant repro-
ductive products. But, factors significant to populational stability are often better charac-
terized as counteractive. The most familiar case is provided by natural selection. In a case of 
selectional stability, there is both a stable populational frequency distribution of, say, genes, 
morphology, or behavior as well as an overall reproductive tendency to drive the population 
away from that frequency distribution. The latter would reflect that reproductive output 
by the population at any given generation is likely to be at odds with the long term stable 
frequency distribution. So, in the absence of any further constraints, the frequency distri-
bution within the population should be different than the stable frequency distribution. 
The selective process serves to correct or to counteract the tendency otherwise produced by 
reproduction. With environmental factors affecting the relative fitness of individual varia-
tion (whether individuals are genes, organisms, or groups), individual variation that would 
shift the frequency distribution over the long run is pushed out of the reproductive game. 
Selection is one significant factor that might be characterized at the populational level. But, 
there are non-selectional cases as well. For example, a setup similar to selection is one which 
reduces viability of non-heritable variation to null. The distinctive shape of the human 
heart, it has been suggested, is not a consequence of heritable factors but, instead, is the 
developmental result of a proto-pump responding to the shearing force of blood passing 
through it. (Hove et al. 2003) Simple changes in factors during development can produce 
very different shaped hearts from the same underlying genetics. However, variations on the 
shape of the heart significantly affect pumping capacity and tend to be lethal. A population 
will have a stable heart shape over time but not as a consequence of selection. (It cannot be 
selection, because individual variation is non-heritable.) Alternatively, in ecology, a partic-
ular predator-prey distribution within a locale might be stable over time, because fluctua-
tions from that distribution increase lethality on one side or the other to bring things back 
into line. (Again, this cannot be selection, because the ecological population does not in-
volve a single reproductive population with a heritable trait range.)
Stable populational phenomena can be (and often are) instances of systems stabilized 
by counteractive constraints. The proposed normative mapping should, therefore, apply to 
such populational phenomena. As it is a frequency distribution (e.g., a 1:1 male-to-female 
ratio) that is stabilized, that frequency distribution would be the relevant norm. Whole 
populations are, then, correct or incorrect relative to that norm, and only derivatively 
would normative status accrue to individuals. So, being male is neither right nor wrong, 
5  This is not to say that the interest here is in merely what is common or frequent in a population. The 
interest is in the stability of a frequency or frequency distribution, and that is inclusive of infrequent 
phenomena. 
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but being a member of an overly large male population would be wrong or, better, contrib-
uting to what is wrong about the present population. Though that might seem strange at 
first, ordinary everyday normative reasoning already provides logical space for this sort of 
thought. Burning your leaves in the fall is not on its own good or bad. If the overall popu-
lation is small, there are no negative consequences on yourself or your fellows. If the pop-
ulation of leaf burners is sufficiently large, there can be real negative consequences to the 
health and welfare of yourself and your fellows. In this case, your action is only derivatively 
in the wrong, because you are contributing to a bad situation.
Given the prominence and significance of homeostatic individual systems as well as 
populational phenomena such as stabilizing selection, it should be reasonable to conclude 
that the proposed normative mapping captures at least a sizable section of the target prac-
tice. The proposal plausibly satisfies the first general naturalistic criterion. Let’s turn to the 
second. That criterion requires that the naturalistic proposal accommodate the causal-ex-
planatory practices of the target practice.
Normative status, on the above proposal, indicates some item’s place within a broader 
causal setup structured to act upon it. Whether an item is correct or incorrect has differing 
causal implications within that setup. Negative normative status in particular has the impli-
cation that ‘external’ causal structures should move the respective item back into the target 
stable state. So, for example, a flatworm out in the open is in an incorrect state. The state is 
not incorrect, because flatworms out in the open are much more likely to be eaten. Instead, 
the light-sensing cells of the flatworm will affect a change in state until it is no longer out 
in the open. That is, there is a causal structure in place that acts to bring the flatworm back 
into a target state. That flatworms out in the open are likely to be eaten would be relevant 
to the explanation for why flatworms have a behavioral response system to move them out 
of the light.6 So, the incorrectness of the flatworm has clear causal implications: that a flat-
worm is in an incorrect state explains why it is subsequently moved to cover (or a correct 
6  The line suggested here for the flatworm might strike one as counterintuitive. Intuitively, being out in 
the open is bad for the flatworm, because it is apt to be eaten. Further, it is counterintuitive to think, as 
implied by the above, that being out in the open would not be an incorrect state for the flatworm if the 
counteracting mechanisms were suspended or disabled. These intuitive judgments do reflect a common 
way of speaking about biological organisms, but this way of speaking is also best understood, I think, 
non-literally. Organismal processes or behaviors increase viability or fecundity or they do not. That is, 
processes or behaviors either increase or decrease the probability of ontogenic or phylogenic continua-
tion. The “good for” or “bad for” generated by the above intuitions seems to be simply a way of saying 
that a process, say, increases or decreases, respectively, the probability of system continuation. After all, 
by those intuitions, a hidden flatworm is acting correctly insofar as it is keeping away from predators 
and, thereby, increasing its viability; a flatworm out in the open is acting incorrectly insofar as it is ex-
posed to predation, thereby reducing its viability. But, then, this intuitive application of normative lan-
guage assumes that physical system continuation (whether in the form of the organism or its lineage) is 
a universal norm of the biosphere. It is hard to see, however, why such a norm should be taken literally. 
To take it literally would be to assume that somewhere in nature there exists a system roughly analo-
gous to evaluative judgment operating over the whole of biology within the universe. Or, in a weaker 
version, there is some such analogue operating over and on each distinct biological lineage. As far as I 
can tell, nothing in the present state of biology indicates that anything might serve that role. But, more 
importantly, it is unclear what explanatory advantage is gained by a literal construal. Organisms act in 
ways that either increase or decrease their viability or fecundity, and so, organisms and their lineages ei-
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state). The explanatory target in this case is the alteration of some item to a target stable 
state, but the examples at the outset (e.g., a bird striking a window as a consequence of mis-
perceiving, or a fawn captured by an eagle due to poor hiding behavior) were of a different 
character. In those examples, normative status does not explain the return to a target state 
but explains, instead, some further independent event.
Here’s how I think this further type of explanation can be accommodated. Assume 
that S’s being in α is stabilized by counteractive constraints as well as that some event E 
is explained by S being in α. Given that Sα explains E, the following should be reasona-
ble implications: ceteris paribus, E would take place if a tokened S were in α, and E would 
not take place if a tokened S were not in α. Not-α would not be the absence of state but 
would be S in some further state, such as β,γ, δ, etc., because S cannot exist except in 
some state. Further, not-E would not be the absence of any event but would be some fur-
ther event, such as F, G, H, etc., as even the absence of change is a describable event. By 
the proposed normative mapping, a tokened S in α possesses a positive normative status 
and vice versa. Or, things are as they ought to be when S is α, and things are not as they 
ought to be when S is not-α. So, E should take place, ceteris paribus, when things are as 
they ought to be, and not-E should take place, ceteris paribus, when things are not as they 
ought to be. Citing the positive/negative normative status of some tokened S can ex-
plain, then, some subsequent event, because that status merely refers to whether S is or is 
not in the stabilized state.
Take, for example, a fawn caught by an eagle due to poor hiding behavior or a robin 
striking a window as a consequence of misperceiving it as open space. Hiding behavior 
for pronghorn fawns consists in lying very still in the open prairie. This inherited be-
havior is exhibited at a high frequency among pronghorns and is selectively stabilized by 
heavy predation. As the stabilized behavior, a still fawn would be hiding well, and a jit-
tery fawn would be hiding poorly. A poorly hiding fawn should not be, ceteris paribus, 
passed over by a predator. The capture of a tokened fawn by an eagle can be explained 
then by its poor hiding behavior. (Byers 2002) Or, to take another example, robins make 
use of sight to avoid obstacles in flight. Representational errors concerning such obsta-
cles are potentially catastrophic, so it is not too much of a speculation to think that the 
representational system is stabilized to represent obstacles where they are there and not 
otherwise. So, a robin with a veridical representation of an open space is representing 
well or correctly insofar as there is a system reinforcing the tokening of representations 
like that in those conditions. A correct representation can serve, then, to explain the rob-
in’s avoidance of obstacles, and similarly a false or incorrect representation can explain its 
failure to avoid an obstacle.
6. Capturing too much
The model for mapping normative language onto systems stabilized by counteractive con-
straints might seem to be just too broad a proposal. Abiological physical systems might also 
ther persist or they don’t. Without invoking some classical and mystical form of teleology at this point, 
it is hard to know what explanatory function such a continuation norm might serve. 
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instantiate such stable setups. Yet, it would actually be quite odd if they could not: not only 
is the biological/abiological divide continuous but, as pressed by Ganti (2003) and Kauff-
man (2000), the essential feature of living systems as replicating autocatalytic collectives is 
not unique to life. Independent of the naturalizing account given, what should be expected, 
then, is to find norms outside of the paradigmatic boundaries of the biological. That said, 
normative language is not generally used for explanatory purposes in the physical and 
chemical sciences. If so, why is it that physicists and chemists do not regularly mobilize nor-
mative characterization if the model is on the right track?
That question is a psycho-sociological question. The question is just why have biolo-
gists gone one way and physicists another. Here is, I think, a plausible hypothesis. System 
stability is at the core of biological and cognitive inquiry. Just how an organism can ex-
ist from one moment to the next and, in so doing, counter environmental variability and 
internal degradation are ground level concerns. As a consequence, the normative map-
ping proposed here would be broadly applicable at the key focal point of inquiry. In con-
trast, stable systems do not comprise the core subject matter of physics and chemistry. So, 
for purposes of uniformity of explanation, one would not expect normative language, even 
when appropriate, to be mobilized in those fields.
7. Concluding Remarks
The widespread use of normative language in biological and cognitive explanations presents 
a prima facie problem: natural norms and normative status do not seem to fit into the 
broader picture of the natural world. To dissolve that problem, the suggestion offered here 
was that, first, we map normative language onto systems stabilized by counteractive con-
straints, identifying the norm with the stable state and normative status with distance from 
the stable state. Doing so allows for the satisfaction of the two criteria specific to normativ-
ity by providing a localized feature determinative of a natural null point and providing the 
appropriate causal implications to normative status. Second, relevant real systems seem to 
provide plausible instances of that abstractly specified stable system type. In fact, such real 
systems seem to form the core target of biological and cognitive inquiry. By adopting the 
suggested model, the apparent failure of fit would be merely apparent.
As noted at the outset, much of the interest in natural normativity within the literature 
has been restricted to norms of functional performance. Normativity for the functional 
theorist arises as an issue, because plausibly some items should be functionally classified 
even when they do not or cannot perform the relevant functional effect. So, the functional 
theorist needs to provide some basis for functional classification independent of actual to-
kened performance. Once provided, items can be normatively characterized by reference to 
the function that they ought to perform as members of a functional category. But, by meth-
odologically isolating the normative question from the functional one, the paradigmatic ex-
ample of normativity shifted from the success or failings of some device to the broader case 
of normative judgment and its consequences. (It is broader, because the evaluation of a de-
vice is just one example of normative judgment.) Using normative judgment and its con-
sequences as the paradigmatic case required that the relevant naturalistic analogue have 
something like a “corrective mechanism”. That requirement goes beyond what is neces-
sary for a successful functional account. That the requirements for a successful functional 
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account and for a successful normative account can conceptually come apart suggests four 
different points.
1. The success of a functional account does not hinge on providing literal norms of 
performance. Some supplied naturalistic basis can plausibly serve the needs of a 
functional theory without meeting the criteria for normativity. Given the adop-
tion of some functional theory, we can have grounds to take its described functions 
as real natural phenomena without yet having a reason to take its described norms 
of functional performance as anything more than a heuristic device.
2. Whether some particular norm of functional performance is a norm in fact is con-
tingent. Whether the appropriate naturalistic setup is in place for a literal natural 
norm is a fact conceptually independent from the naturalistic basis for functional 
ascription. Whether the described norm of functional performance is a norm in 
fact is, therefore, an independent empirical hypothesis.
3. It may turn out that all natural norms are in fact only norms of functional per-
formance. That would not imply that all norms of functional performance are 
themselves literally norms given the conceptual divide in functional and normative 
requirements.
4. It is possible that not all natural norms are norms of functional performance. 
Given the shift to the broader category of normative judgment and its conse-
quences, the specification of a naturalistic norm did not need to make any refer-
ence to function. That permits accommodating the very real possibility that some 
human as well as animal traditions might exist as norms without serving any func-
tion.
The model offered here should not be seen as conflicting with or even favoring any par-
ticular functional account. Instead, it just provides an independent means to assess the 
extent to which we should take some norm of functional performance to be literally a 
norm.
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